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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PARLEY MARSH, 
Plaintiff (J;rtd Respondent, 
-vs.-
ROBERT BRYCE IRVINE, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
JA~IES BLACKWOOD NEIL, 
Def enda.nt and Respondent. 
Case 
No.11255 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff Marsh to recover 
damages for injuries arising out of the automobile acci-
dent, against two defendants, one of whom, Irvine, was 
the driver of the vehicle in which Marsh was riding and 
the other, Neil, the driver of the vehicle which struck the 
rear of the Irvine vehicle in which plaintiff was riding. 
Irvine also filed a cross-claim against the other defend-
ant, Neil, for damage to the Irvine vehicle. (After this 
brirf was prepared Neil settled with Irvine for Irvine's 
damages and the cross-claim has been dismissed.) 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The ease was tried before a. jury which returned a 
verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant Irvine for 
$10,000.00 and a no cause verdict in favor of the de- ' 
fendant Neil on both the complaint and the cross-claim. 
The trial court subsequently denied defendant Irvine's 
motion for a. new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court; that the Supreme Court enter a judgment 
for the defendant Irvine as a matter of law on the plain-
tiff's complaint and in the alternative for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The collision out of which the plaintiff's cause of 
action arose occurred on the 9th day of November, 1964, 
at about 4 :20 p.m. on State Road 201 which is the main 
highway going past the Magna. Mill and Arthur Smelter. 
(See Exhibit 3-P). 
The plaintiff Marsh and defendant Irvine both 
worked at the Arthur Concentrate Plant. Marsh, to-
gether with Russell Beck and Bud Turpin rode back and 
forth to work from Salt Lake City with Irvine in his 
1962 Ford station wagon on about a daily basis paying 
-:\lr. Irvine $.75 per day for the ride (R. 345). 
State Highway 201 in the area where the accident 
occurred is a four-lane hard surface highway running 
2 
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o-euernlly east and west with the inside eastbound lane tl . • 
being l 4 feet 6 inches wide and the outside lane 13 feet 
wide. There is also an 8-f oot hard surface shoulder used 
for emergency stopping on the south side of the highway 
(R. 222). The east and westbound lanes of traffic are 
separated by a raised island (R. 223) which has a break 
in it at the junction with the Magna Mill Road. (See 
Exhibits 2-P and 3-P). The Magna Mill Road joins 
from the south. A stop sign faces traffic going from the 
l\Iagna Mill Road onto Highway 201 (Exhibits 3-P, 6, 
7, 8 and 9-P). The stop sign is 12 feet south of the 
south edge of Highway 201 and 6 feet east of the east 
edge of the Magna Road. Officer Hayward, the investi-
gating officer from the Utah Highway Patrol, described 
the highway as a fairly new asphalt base with oil and 
rock chip surface (R. 281) and probably travel worn 
(R. 222) or traffic worn (R. 281). The highway was 
fairly level in the area where the accident occurred 
(R. 277, Exhibits 6, 7, 8 and 9-P). 
Officer Hayward testified that using an average drag 
factor for that highway, reaction time, plus stopping dis-
tance at 60 miles per hour on that highway was 250 feet, 
ancl other speeds as follows: 
50 miles per hour - 178 feet 
45 miles per hour - 154 feet. 
40 miles per hour - 126 feet 
35 miles per hour - 102 feet. 
:~o miles per hour - 79 feet. 
(R. 282) 
3 
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Visibility is good for several hundred feet both to 
the east and west from the Magna Road along Highway 
201 (R. 277). . 
When he arrived, he noted the Neil and Irvine ve-
hicles both in the inside lane of traffic where they came 
to rest after the accident (R. 224). The vehicles were 
several feet apart, and .Mr. Irvine's vehicle was 77 feet 
east of the west end of two brake marks in the inside 
lane of traffic which were each 7 feet long and began 140 
feet from the exit of the Magna Mill Road. These marks 
were left by the Neil vehicle and were the only marks 
left by the vehicle (R. 231, 232). 
At the time of the accident the road was dry, it was 
daylight and the road was clean (R. 234-235, 237). 
The officer thought the point of impact to be in the 
inside lane of traffic in the area of the two brake marks 
but excluded the possibility of the impact being to the 
·west of the marks (R. 232-233, 288). 
On cross-examination the officer said he couldn't say 
whether the impact was beyond the skid marks or at the 
skid marks (R. 288-289). No other evidence was given 
by the officer as to where the impact took place (R. 289). 
The officer checked the area west of the seven-foot skid 
mark for a distance of 200 to 300 feet and found no other 
marks (R. 297). Damage to defendant Neil's vehicle 
on the front end was $75.00; damage to defendant 
Irvine's vehicle on the left rear was very slight (R. 297, 
301, 370). 
4 
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Mr. Irvine, with Mr. Marsh in the front seat of the 
car, stopped at the stop sign at the Mill Road entrance 
to the main highway and picked up Mr. Beck and Mr. 
Turpin. He stopped about five feet west of the east edge 
of the Magna Mill Road and at about the stop sign (R. 
351) with the front end about five feet south of Highway 
201 ( R. 366). He then looked to the west for approach-
ing traffic. He observed traffic about 500 feet to the west 
of the intersection (R. 354) in both lanes of traffic (R. 
3f55) with traffic in the inside lane being a little further 
away (R. 367). Mr. Beck, in the back seat, said, "It is 
clear; let's go.'' Irvine entered into the intersection 
and drove across the outside lane and into the inside lane 
as indicated on Exhibit P in red (R. 359). He placed 
the point of impact at a distance approximately 230 feet 
east of the east edge of the Magna Road entrance in the 
inside lane of traffic (R. 359) as shown in red. He was 
traveling at between 30 to 35 miles per hour when his 
1·ehicle was struck from the rear by the Neil vehicle 
(R. 360-361). In entering the intersection he drove in a 
normal manner and did not accelerate rapidly. When 
he left the stop sign, he did not proceed down the right-
hand lane and then swing over to the inside lane (R. 362-
363) but made a normal curve pattern into the inside 
lane ( R. 367). He estimated he was going 15 miles per 
hour as he entered the inside lane of traffic (R. 234). 
After observing the traffic west of the intersection and 
entering the intersection he did not again look to the 
west, and he did not see the Neil vehicle until after im-
pact ( R. 444, 445). 
5 
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The defendant, Mr. Neil, was on his way from Too. 
ele to Sandy. He had been to Tooele in connection with 
his plumbing business and was driving a 1964 Chevrolet 
Greenbrier van-type vehicle. He had been over this road 
many times and was aware that there was a change of 
shift taking place at the mills as he was driving along the 
highway (R. 477) and was also aware of the congested 
traffic condition. He was traveling at a speed of 60 
miles per hour which was the posted limit. When he 
first saw the defendant Irvine's vehicle, it was stopped at 
the stop sign, and Mr. Neil testified he was then 150 feet 
away traveling at 60 miles per hour (R. 454, 464). He , 
observed Irvine move out into the intersection. He dis-
agreed with Mr. Irvine's drawing as to the path the 
Irvine vehicle took from the stop sign and claimed that 
it went directly north until it entered his lane of traffic 
(R. 456; also see the green line drawn on Exhibit 3-P by 
Mr. Neil representing the path of Irvine's vehicle). He 
also placed the point of impact where the two short green 
lines appear east of the intersection 180 feet (R. 457, 467). 
The Irvine vehicle moved uninterruptedly into the in-
tersection, and it wasn't fast (R. 458). Neil testified that 
Irvine was going about 20 miles per hour when he crossed 
into his lane of traffic and that he was going 30 to 33 
miles per hour at impact ( R. 458). The direction of tra\'-
el of the Irvine vehicle caused Neil some alarm as he 
saw it coming toward his lane of traffic (R. 458). 
When Neil first saw the Irvine vehicle moving out 
into the intersection, he applied his brakes but his ve-
hicle swayed and almost went out of control. He then 
6 
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rrleased the brake and let the engine take over the vehicle 
again and then he jammed on the brakes again to stop 
it, but the impact was definitely not where the skid marks 
i\'erc but further east (R. 459). He thought he was going 
around 30 miles per hour at the time of impact with the 
Inine vehicle (R. 459). Neil testified that Irvine should 
haw gotten up as much speed as he possibly could when 
he got in his lane, but instead got in the fast lane and 
loafed along (R. 460, 488) or drove in a normal man-
ner (R. 477). 
When Irvine entered Neil's lane of traffic, Neil was 
13 to 100 feet back from the stop sign and still going 60 
milrs per hour. He said it was doubtful that he could 
haYe stopped before he got to the point of impact if he 
had kept his brakes on when he first applied them (R. 
481) but admitted he could have slowed the vehicle to 
less than 30 miles per hour (R. 481). 
Captain Ed Pitcher of the Utah Highway Patrol was 
called as an expert witness. He testified that he has had 
28 years of experience with the Utah Highway Patrol 
and has investigated thousands of accidents, has had 
many yea rs of training and has also trained police offi-
cers in Utah in accident investigation for many years. 
Captain Pitcher testified that on a good asphalt road, 
which \\'as dry and free from debris, where the tempera-
ture was not unusual and the road was level, the prob-
able stopping distance of an ordinary car with good tires 
including reaction time and based on an average drag 
factor of .65 would be as follows: 
7 
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60 miles per hour - 251 feet 
(R. 509) 66 feet reaction time. 
55 miles per hour - 215 feet 
50 miles per hour -182 feet 
45 miles per hour - 153 feet 
40 miles per hour - 128 feet 
35 miles per hour - 101 feet 
30 miles per hour - 79 feet 
and that the average reaction time is three-fourths of one 
second. Captain Pitcher measured the distance on the 
scaled drawing on the line of travel as given by Mr. Neil 
for the Irvine vehicle from the stop sign to the inside 
lane of eastbound traffic as 33 feet and the distance from 
the point where Mr. Neil placed the point of impact to 
where he entered the inside lane of traffic as 180 feet from 
the scaled drawing. Using these factors and on the basis 
of a hypothetical question from plaintiff's counsel which 
assumed that the Irvine vehicle traveled from a stopped 
position at the stop sign to a speed of 35 miles per hour 
at the point of impact as testified to by witnesses, there 
being a total distance of 213 feet from the stop sign to 
the point of impact, Captain Pitcher computed it would 
take a total of 8.4 seconds. 
From the point where Irvine entered the inside lane 
of traffic to the point of impact would take 5.1 seconds. 
He also computed on the basis of his experience and 
the hypothetical question that Irvine would enter the 
inside lane at a speed of 13.7 miles per hour (R. 510). 
He also testified that a car could not accelerate to a speed 
of 35 miles per hour in a distance of 32 feet; that that 
is about three times the expected maximum acceleration 
of the ordinary car, (R. 565, 566) and that he couIJ no! 
8 
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make the turn at that speed. On the basis of the same 
drag factor, Pitcher testified that Neil would slow from 
60 miles per hour to 35 miles per hour in a distance of 122 
feet (R. 511, 519) and that it would take 1.7 seconds to 
slow from 60 down to 35 leaving a balance in time of 3.4 
seconds reserve time (R. 517, 520). The Neil car at that 
point if brakes were applied would h€ 423 feet west of 
the point of impact. At 60 miles per hour he could have 
brought his vehicle to a complete stop in 4.2 seconds after 
the brakes were applied (R. 517). With 5.1 seconds avail-
able to Neil after Irvine entered the inside lane and 
including three-fourths of a second reaction time Neil 
could have come to a complete stop before the point of 
impact with .15 seconds to spare. [Mr. Neil claimed that 
he had faster than average reaction time which he said 
was five seconds. His was three seconds (R. 478, 479).] 
To slow to 30 miles per hour from 60 with a drag factor 
of .65 would take 139 feet. 
Captain Pitcher also testified that he supervised 
11ome tests in the area of the accident on June 27, 1965, 
about seYen months after this accident (R. 539). The 
tests ·were taken in between the two flumes shown in Ex-
hibit 8-P (R. 540). The drag factor or co-efficient of 
friction determined by those tests were . 79 and .80 (R. 
544). He also testified that he was acquainted with the 
road, that it was a high-type road with a good surface 
on it, that his tests were made when the road was dry 
and clear of foreign material and that the surface where 
he made his tests appeared to be similar to the road 
\\'ere the accident occurred. He checked it again the 
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night before testifying ( R. 542-544). :Mr. Irvine testifie<l 
the road surface had not bee11 changed since the accide 11t 
(R. 653). 
With a drag factor of .79 it would take 114 feet to 
slow from 60 miles per hour to 30 according to Captain 
Pitcher ( R. 572). 
During the beginning phase of the case while Officer 
Hayward was testifying the court in chambers advised 
all counsel that it would not allow testimony of Officer 
Hayward \vi th respect to the co-efficient of friction of the 
highway (R. 269) but that after the witness qualified 
as an expert through experience and training that he 
could testify relative to the approximate stopping dis-
tances ( R. 269). The officer was thereafter permitted to 
testify from his Utah Highway Patrol chart on stopping 
distances using what he considered was an average drag 
factor for the highway in question as previously de-
scribed by him (R. 282-285). 
Subsequently, when Captain Ed Pitcher testified as 
an expert witness, the stopping distances were again 
brought out on the basis of an average drag factor for 
the highway as described by Officer Hayward (R. 294-
496). 
On Voir Dire Examination by Mr. Hanson Captain 
Pitcher, who had been in court during Officer Hayward's 
testimony and was aware of the court's ruling with r~­
spect to using the term "co-efficient of friction," testi-
fied that he was using an average drag factor for good 
10 
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roa(ls, good tires and so on, but the court finally allowed 
~Ir. Hanson to bring out he was using a factor of .65 
( R. 4-9:5). 
On cross-examination he was allowed to bring out 
from Captain Pitcher that the chart used by Officer Hay-
11·a nl s!JOvYecl a co-efficient of friction of .45 to .65 for a 
t rnffic polished road on speeds over 30 miles per hour and 
to elicit from him the various stopping distances at 
speeds of 60 to 30 miles per hour using those drag fac-
tors. (H. 520-524, 552-553) Captain Pitcher did not agree 
\ritl1 tlie ehart and didn't agree that the numbers on the 
cliart were proper numbers (R. 526). 
The testimony on this interrogation follows: 
rfHE CouRT: I want to make my point again; 
this witness has not testified as to the quality of 
that particular road. 
).[ R. H uN'r: Correct. 
THE CouRT: He says, according to the chart 
he uses, a good asphalt road-travel-polished-
n1 ries between .45 as a drag-factor and a .65 as a 
drag-factor. 
:JfR. H uNT: Who testified to that~ 
THE CouRT: Captain Pitcher; he says he uses 
this chart. 
A. No ; I just read the chart; he asked me 
what it read. I read it to him. I didn't agree 
t hos0 are the proper numbers. 
THE CouRT: You don't agree with your own 
chart? 
11 
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A. That is just a suggestive chart and it 1·-. t 11 ' ~. ac ua y a page from a textbook which is used, 
but. may have value where there are no tests 
available. 
THE CouRT: That is something entirely differ-
ent; I assumed it was your chart. You put it out. 
You have the officers use it? 
A. It is suggestive; where there are no tests 
available, or any other information. 
Mn. HANSON : Your Honor-
A. Might continue-I might explain why I use 
.65 in dealing with these -
l\fa. HANSON: I think that is immaterial. We 
do have a point here, where there is no specific 
drag-factor available. Maybe, I will have to go 
into this chart, with the Jury, tomorrow. 
MR. HuNT: Your Honor, it was the Court that 
suggested we got to avoid this type of thing, and, 
now, goes into matters of coefficient of friction or 
drag-factor, and I am sure we are into the con-
fusion -
(Argument.) 
THE CouRT: :!\Iy suggestion was, the use hy 
plaintiff of his own witness of calling for an ex-
pression of coefficient of friction; I permitted 
the testimony of Hayward to come in just as yon 
requested it, and it is in the record. It is before 
the Jury. 
If Mr. Hanson wants to attempt to bewilder 
the Jury with scientific terms, without an cxplana~ 
tion of what drag-factor and what coefficient ~! 
frction means, it would seem to me you shouldn t 
object to that. 
(R. 526-527) 
12 
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Thr court admitted Captain Pitcher's testimony 
with respect to the skid tests made by him but would only 
admit tt>stimony of the slowing distance from 60 miles 
per hour to 30 miles per hour using the test skid drag 
factor, although counsel sought to introduce other speeds 
suC'h as 35 miles per hour which had been testified to by 
witm•ssrs (R. 571-573). He was allowed to compute over 
ohjection the distances for stopping using a co-efficient 
of friction of .45 and Neil's counsel wrote them down on 
n chnrt for the jury (R. 575). 
rrhe court refused to give defendant Irvine's re-
quested Instruction No. 1 for a directed verdict but did 
gin~ the following instructions which counsel for Irvine 
ohjecte(l to (R. 665, 666): 
#6 - The rules of evidence ordinarily do not 
permit the opinion of a witness to be received as 
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the 
case of expert ·witnesses. A doctor, engineer, ap-
JJraiser or mechanic who by education, study and 
experience has become an expert in any art, 
science or profession, and who is called as a wit-
ness, may give his opinion as to any matter in 
which he is versed and which is material to the 
case. You should consider such expert opinion 
and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. 
Give the opinion the weight to which you deem it 
entitled, whether it be great or slight, and you 
may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons 
given for it are unsound. (R 105) (emphasis ours) 
#15 - You are instructed that it is the law 
of this state that no person shall drive a vehicle 
011 a highway at a speed greater than is reason-
able and prudent under the conditions and hav-
ing regard to the actual and potential hazards 
13 
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then existing. The driver of every vehicle shall 
consiste~t with these requirements, drive at ai; 
appropriate reduced speed when special hazards 
exist with respect to the traffic or by reason of 
the width of the highway, weather, the fact that 
one may be approaching an intersection or any 
other actual or potential hazards then existing. 
If you find from the evidence that either of the 
defendants drove his vehicle at a greater speed 
than was reasonable and prudent, considering 
the actual and potential hazards then existing, 
then, in that event, said driver was guilty of neg-
ligence. (R. 114) 
#20 - The law requires t'iat no person shall 
turn a vehicle upon a public highway unless and 
until such movement can be made with reasonable 
safety. This does not mean, however, that the 
driver of a motor vehicle, before making a turn, 
must know that there is no possibility of accident. 
It means that before starting to turn a vehicle 
and while making the turn, the driver of the 
vehicle must use such precaution as would satisfy 
a reasonably prudent person, acting under similar 
circumstances, that the turn could be made safely. 
(R. 119) 
#21 - You are instructed that when the driver 
of a vehicle intends to make a right-hand turn at 
an intersection, both the approach for the right 
turn and the right turn itself shall be made as ' 
close as practical to the right-hand edge of the 
road or roadways, and that on a roadway whe:e 
there are two or more lanes marked for traffic m 
each direction the driver of the vehicle making 
the right hand turn shall remain in the outside 
lane and shall not thereafter change to the left 
or inside lane until the driver has first ascertained 
that such movement can be made with safety. 
Should it appear from a preponderance of the 
14 
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evidence that a driver in making a right hand 
turn failed to execute the turn in the manner 
aforesaid, that driver would be guilty of negli-
gence. (R. 120) 
#22 - You are instructed that the laws of the 
State of Utah provide that whenever any road-
way has been divided into two or more clearly 
marked lanes for traffic a vehicle shall be driven 
as nearly as practical entirely within a single 
lane and shall not be moved from such lane until 
the driver has first ascertained that such move-
ment can be made with safety. A finding from a 
preponderance of the evidence that a driver in 
driving his car failed to comply with the foreging 
requirement would make that driver guilty of 
negligence. (R. 121) 
#23 - A person, who without negligence on 
his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted 
with peril arising from either the actual presence 
or the appearance of imminent danger to himself 
or others is not expected nor required to use the 
same judgment and prudence that may be required 
of him in calmer and more deliberate moments. 
In such a situation, his duty is to exercise 
only the degree of care which an ordinarily pru-
dent person would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances. If, at that moment, he 
exercises such care, he does all the law requires 
of him, even though in the light of after events, it 
might appear that a different choice and manner 
of action would have been better and safer. 
(R. 122) 
The court also refused to give defendant's requested 
Instruction No. 17 as follows: 
#17 - Even though one party involved in a col-
lision may be negligent, nonetheless, if the opera-
15 
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tor of the other vehicle actually sees or discover 
the negligence, or in the exercise of due cars shou~d ha"."e seen o:r ~iscovered the negligence, ii~ 
si:fficient time to avoid the accident with opportu-
mty so to do, then you are instructed that it his 
duty to do so, and if he fails to act to avoid the 
accident with such opportunity, he is negligent. 
If, therefore, you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence in this case that the defendant, Rob. 
ert B. Irvine, was negligent in pulling out into the 
through highway from the stop sign, but you fur. 
ther found from a preponderance of the evidence 
in this case that the defendant, James B. Neil. 
saw, or in the exercise of due care should have 
seen, the automobile of the defendant Irvine en-
tering the highway when Neil was a sufficient dis-
tance away to avoid the accident and he failed to 
do so, his failure would constitute negligence upon 
his part and if such negligence on the part of the 
defendant Neil was a proximate cause of the acci-
dent, then your verdict must be against the de-
fendant, James B. Neil. (R. 54) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT IRVINE'S REQUEST 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO CAUSE 
OF ACTION AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF 
MARSH ON HIS COMPLAINT AND IN FAV-
OR OF IRVINE AND AGAINST THE CROSS· 
DEFENDANT NEIL ON IRVINE'S CROSS· 
CLAIM. (THE CROSS-CLAIM HAS BEEN 
PAID SINCE THE APPEAL WAS FILED.) 
The defendant, Irvine, takes the position in this case 
that the court should have granted a directed verdict in 
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favor of the defendant, Irvine, because the evidence was 
dear that Irvine had entered the intersection into the 
inside lane and proceeded so far east thereon, to-wit: 
180 feet, that his conduct in entering the intersection as 
he Jid did not constitute negligence and certainly was not 
a proximate cause of the accident, if there was any negli-
gence on his part. The investigating officer testified that 
Jw found two seven-foot skid marks commencing at a 
distance 140 feet east of the east edge of the intersecting 
}fagna Road in the inside lane of traffic. He also testi-
fied that in his opinion the impact occurred somewhere 
in the area of the skid marks but he was unable to tell 
1rl1ere hecause there was nothing but the skid marks from 
1rhich he could pick up a point of impact. Every one 
of tlw witnesses present at the time of the accident put 
the point of impact beyond the two skid marks including 
Mr. Neil whose vehicle apparently left the two skid marks 
of 7 feet. According to Mr. Neil the point of impact 
occurred at a distance of 180 feet east of the point where 
}Ir. Irvine entered into the inside lane of traffic, and it 
was his testimony that Mr. Irvine came directly out from 
the point where he was stopped by the stop sign into the 
inside lane of traffic as is indicated by the green line 
shown on Exhibit 3-P which was made by Mr. Neil. 
l\lr. Irvine, on the other hand, while indicating that he 
did not cross into the inside lane as sharply as Mr. Neil 
has indicated, did testify that the point of impact was fur-
ther to the east than that shown by Mr. Neil. This is indi-
c·ated on the diagram by two red marks, one of which is in 
the imicle lane of traffic and the other in the outside lane, 
hut both of ·which Mr. Irvine testified should have been 
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placed in the inside lane of traffic. He placed the poiut 
of impact about 190 feet east of the point where he said 
he crossed over into the inside lane of traffic. 
Captain Pitcher testified that it would take 3.1 sec-
onds from the time the vehicle crossed into the inside 
lane of traffic to travel the 180 feet to the point of impact. 
At that point, Mr. Irvine, by the testimo11y of all witness-
es, was traveling a.ta speed of 30 to 33 miles per hour and 
was gradually accelerating. l\fr. X eil was tranling at a 
speed of 60 miles per hour which was the admitted speed 
limit. There was no evidence to the contrary concerning 
this. When he first saw the defendant Irvine's vehicle, 
it was stopped at the stop sign, and Mr. Neil said that 
he was then 150 feet away traveling at 60 miles per hour. 
All of the actual eye witnesses, including ~Ir. Neil, testi-
fied that Mr. Irvine proceeded out from the stop sign in a 
normal manner without any undue acceleration. Cap-
tain Pitcher computed that the I1Tine vehicle on normal 
acceleration would be going 13.7 miles per hour as it 
entered the inside lane. :Mr. Irvine testified that he 
thought he was going about 15 miles per hour as he en-
tered the inside lane of eastbound traffic. There is lit-
tle, if any, dispute, therefore about five important fact~ 
in this case: (1) that Mr. Neil was traveling at a speed 
of 60 miles per hour as he approached the intersection; 
(2) that he saw the Irvine vehicle at the stop sigu and 
watched it continuously thereafter; (3) that .Mr. Irvine 
was traveling at a speed of about 30 to 35 miles per 
hour, at time of impact; ( 4) that .Mr. Irvine drove in a 
normal manner with respect to the speed at which he 
traveled from the stopped position at the stop sign to a 
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poi11t approximately 180 feet east of where he entered 
the iHsid<' lane of traffic and ( 5) that the point of impact 
occurred approximately 180 feet east of where Mr. Irvine 
entered the inside lane of traffic. 
It would have been impossible for the accident to 
ha Ye occurred in the manner it did if 2\iir. Neil was only 
LiO feet away from Mr. Irvine at the time he first ob-
sr1Ted the Irvine vehicle stopped at the stop sign. At 
GO miles per hour Mr. Neil was covering 88 feet a sec-
ond aud in two seconds would have covered 176 feet 
which would have put him past the point where Mr. 
lrYine entered into the inside lane of traffic before Irvine 
got to it. By Captain Pitcher's calculations it would 
take :'.\tr. Irvine 3.3 seconds to travel from a stopped posi-
tion at the stop sign to the inside lane of traffic. During 
that 3.3 seconds Mr. Neil at 60 miles per hour would 
CO\'er a distance of 290 feet. In addition thereto we 
must take into consideration that Mr. Irvine traveled 
approximately 5.1 seconds after getting into the inside 
laue of traffic, part of which time Mr.Neil was undoubted-
ly also still traveling at a speed of 60 miles per hour or 
88 feet per second. This computation was to the rear of 
the I nine vehicle which was involved in the impact. Mr. 
"X eil, therefore, had to be some 600 or 700 feet west of 
the intersection at the time Mr. Irvine first started out 
from the stop sign. 
Captain Pitcher computed that it would take 1.7 sec-
owls on the highway in question to slow from 60 miles 
prr hour down to 35 using a drag factor of .65 and that 
it would take him 122 feet to reduce his speed during that 
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period of time from 60 miles per hour to 35 miles per 
hour. He also testified that at the commencement of the 
5.1 seconds the Neil vehicle would be back 423 feet from 
the point where the collision took place (R. 517). Mr. 
Neil, therefore, had three times the time he needed to 
slow from 60 miles per hour to 30 or 35 miles per hour 
to avoid running into the rear end of the Irvine vehicle. 
There was no need for a sharp application of brakes 
nor for Mr. Neil to run up on the Irvine vehicle applying 
his brakes hard as he did at the last instant. 
Using the correct co-efficient of friction of about .79 
for the highway, the defendant, Neil, would have had 
even more time to slow down or to stop. It would only 
take 114 feet to slow from 60 miles per hour to 30 ac-
cording to Captain Pitcher with the drag factor of .79. 
l\Ir. Irvine was so far east of the intersection at the 
time the impact occurred that neither the intersection 
law nor the right turn law applied with the duties of the 
drivers to each other but the law of preceding and fol-
lowing vehicles was applicable. 
In the case of Nels on v. Molena (Wash. Jan. 1959), 
334 P.2d 170, the defendant made a right turn onto an 
arterial highway. The defendant then traveled a dis-
tance of between 60 feet and 100 feet before being struck 
by the plaintiff who was proceeding in the same direc-
tion on the arterial highway. The plaintiff testified that 
he was driving between 50 and 60 miles per hour. The 
speed limit was 50 miles per hour. The question pre-
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sentecl to the appellate court was whether or not an in-
strnction should have been given applicable to right-of-
way at an intersection. The appellate court held that 
the principles of law that applied and the instructions 
1d1ich should have been given were those applicable to 
follo,ring and preceding drivers and the statute relating 
to an overtaking driver was applicable. This case is sim-
ilar to the one now before this court but the defendant 
I nine's case is even stronger in that he had traveled 
approximately 180 feet after entering into the lane of 
traffic in which the accident occurred and in which Mr. 
Xeil was traveling. Therefore, the law on intersections 
did not apply nor did the law on making a right turn 
apply. Mr. Irvine had traveled so far into the lane 
that neither of these fact situations were applicable to 
the situation that existed at the time the impact oc-
curred. In the case of Hollis E. Walker v. Levi G. Pe-
f Prso11, 3 Ut.(2) 54, 278 P.2d 291, the defendant Peter-
soH was making a left turn at an intersection near Bear 
River City and observed the plaintiff Walker's vehicle a 
distance north coming the opposite direction which he es-
timated iu excess of 375 feet from the intersection where 
he was making the turn. The left turning driver did not 
'lee the other car nor look again until after he heard the 
screech of brakes and a horn sound and then it was too 
late to avoid a collision. The trial court found that both 
parties were negligent but that the speed of the plain-
tiff's vehicle was not a proximate cause of the collision 
and euterecl judgment for the plaintiff. 
'rhe speed limit just north of the intersection was 
GO miles per hour but a short distance before the inter-
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section and through it wa8 40 miles per hour. The plain-
tiff's car left 148 feet of skid marks up to the point of 
impact. The court on appeal said under normal condi-
tions the stopping distance on the surfaced highway after 
brakes have been applied is 128 feet at 50 miles per hour 
and 155 feet at 55 miles per hour. This was on the basis 
of data published by the Utah Highway Patrol. So if 
plaintiff had stopped in the 148 feet, it would appear that 
he was traveling 50 to 55 miles per hour when he applier] 
his brakes, but he did not stop in that distance. There 
was evidence indicating a speed considerably in excess of 
55 miles per hour. Based on the reaction time plus the 
skid distance, the court concluded that the plaintiff must 
have been 203 feet away when dauger was recognized and 
that if he had been traveling at the lawful speed of 40 
miles per hour, he would have stopped in 126 feet or ii 
feet short of the point of impact; whereas, the speed at 
which he was traveling rendered it impossible for him 
to stop. Under such state of facts said the court, "We do 
not see how reasonable minds could conclude other than 
that plaintiff's excessive speed was a contributing cause 
of the accident.'' 
In the case now before this court the evidence is 
clear that \vhen :I\Ir. Irvine entered the inside lane of traf-
fic, the defendant Neil was 400 to 500 feet away. All the 
distance he needed to slow to 35 miles per hour with the 
co-efficient of friction of .65 was 122 feet and if he had 
slowed to a speed of 30 to 35 miles an hour, there would 1 
have been no accident. It is clear, therefore, that his 
failure to slow his vehicle was not only negligence bu1 
22 
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was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Irvine 
th·o,·e approximately 200 feet in the Jane of traffic where 
the accideut occurred with the rear of the vehicle being 
180 feet from the point where entry was made into the 
inside Jane of traffic, the point of impact having occurred 
on tile rear of his vehicle 180 feet from the point where 
(be vehicle entered the inside lane. 
TH the case of Hefferma(n. v. Rosser (Pa., 1965), 419 
Pa. 550, 215 A.2d 655, the plaintiff contended that he en-
!C'red the highway from the north directly opposite the 
1~xit of a motel, traveled across two westbound lanes of 
traffic and into the inside eastbound lane of traffic to pro-
ceed in an easterly direction and traveled some 140 to 150 
fee( before he was struck in the rear by the defendant's 
whicle which was also proceeding east in the inside lane 
of traffic. The accident occurred at night, but the high-
way was well lighted. 
According to the defendant's testimony, he was pro-
cercling at a speed of approximately 40 to 45 miles per 
hour and saw the plaintiff's automobile when defend-
ant's automobile was about a car length from it. He 
claimed that the plaintiff came a.cross the highway from 
the center of three exits from the motel whereas the 
plaintiff claimed he came out of the highway from the 
,,·esterly most exit from the motel. 
A jury found both parties guilty of negligence but 
on plaintiff's motion a new trial was granted. The trial 
court assigned two reasons for granting the new trial 
(a) That in submitting the issue of contributory negli-
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gence to the jury he was iri. error and (b) that the ver. 
diet was against the weight of the evidence. 
The Supreme Court in reYiewing the case stated that 
the record indicated that certain facts were established 
beyond question: ( 1) The impact or contact between 
the two motor vehicles took place at a point on the inside 
eastbound lane directly opposite the motel's middle 
driveway; (2) The defendant's motor vehicle struck the 
plaintiff's motor vehicle in the rear; (3) Immediate!>· 
after the accident def endaut, a construction worker 
whose shoes were muddy, told the investigating police 
officer that due to the muddy condition of his shoes, his 
foot had slipped off the brake; ( 4) Route 22 at the point 
of the accident vms at the time of the accident and is 
generally a very heavily traveled highway, and such 
traffic generally travels at high speed; ( 5) The plaintiff 
was thoroughly familiar with the highway having en-
tered the highway from the motel many times previously 
to the accident; ( 6) The defendant did not actually see 
plaintiff's motor vehicle enter the highway from thC' 
middle driveway. 
The court said the crux of the appeal is whether 
upon the basis of the instant record there was sufficient 
evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff to justify the trial court in instructing the jury ' 
on that subject and to sustain a jury verdict based upon 
the finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
The trial court concluded there was not such evidence. 
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The court then said, as to the manner of the hap-
pening of the accident: 
We have the oral testimony of both plaintiff 
and defendant plus certain incontrovertible facts 
established by the testimony. Plaintiff, fully 
aware of the danger inherent in the heavy and 
fast speeding traffic proceeding both westerly and 
easterly on the highway, upon leaving the motel 
endeavored to effect an entry upon the highway 
which required passage over the two westbound 
lanes and a left-turn into the inside eastbound 
lane. To safely effect such an entry required 
observation of both westbound and eastbound 
traffic and the entry necessarily had to be made in 
a hasty and expeditious manner. If believed, 
plaintiff's testimony would indicate that he made 
the necessary traffic observations, that he came 
out fast on the highway, that he had successfully 
negotiated the passage over the westbound lanes 
and into the inside eastbound lane and that not 
only was he in the latter lane when struck, but 
he had proceeded in that lane for 140 to 150 feet 
when the rear end collision took place. On the 
other hand, the defendant testified that the acci-
dent occurred not after plaintiff had effected an 
entry into the eastbound lane and after he had 
proceeded therein 140 to 150 feet, but at the time 
plaintiff was entering the eastbound lane. 
Under plaintiff's version not only was he not 
contributorily negligent but defendant was negli-
gent in that he had full and adequate opportunity 
to avoid a collision with plaintiff's vehicle. Under 
d<:>f endant 's version because of the manner in 
which plaintiff entered the eastbound lane defend-
ant was afforded no opportunity to avoid the col-
lision and plaintiff negligently effected an entry 
into the path of defendant's eastbound vehicle. 
25 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~l1he court, therefore, held that inasmuch as there 
was a conflict in the evidence as to the point at which 
the plaintiff's vehicle entered the eastbound lane, that is 
whether at the point of impact or whether at the west 
exit from the motel this became a jury question and 
the trial court was not justified in granting a new trial. 
The plaintiff's contention of the facts in this case is 
quite in line with the undisputed facts in the lltarsh-lr-
1.:ine-N eil case and on the basis of the undisputed facts iu 
this case with respect to where the impact occurred and 
where Irvine entered the intersection, there would he 
no negligence on Irvine's part and the sole proximate 
cause of the accident would be the defendant Neil's neg-
ligence. The court, therefore, committed error in re-
fusing to grant the defendant Irvine's request for a di-
rected verdict. 
It should be kept in mind that though the speed limit 
along the area where the accident occurred is 60 miles 
per hour under normal conditions, there was, in fact, at 
the time the accident occurred a congestion of traffic. by 
virtue of the change of shift at the Mills in the area along 1 
which the highway ran, and the defendant, Neil, was well 
aware of this fact. It is obvious that he continued to 
clriYe at 60 miles ner hour even after he saw the defend-
1 
ant Irvine enter the highway and proceed into the inside 
lane of traffic. Several cars had passed through the in-
tersection while Irvine was waiting, and it was after a 
break appeared in the traffic that he proceeded out into 
the intersection. If he had to wait long enough that no 
cars were required to even slow down upon his or an:· 
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otlier cars' entrance into the highway, traffic would then 
be unduly delayed on those streets intersecting with ar-
terial highways. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DE-
FENDANT IRVINE'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
(A) THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY and 
(B) THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
IN ITS RULINGS ON THE EVIDENCE IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLOW THE INVESTIGATING 
OFFICER TO TESTIFY PERTAINNG TO 
THE CO-EFFICIENT OF FRICTION OF THE 
HIGHWAY WHERE THE ACCIDENT OC-
<~URRED BUT LATER ALLOWING CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF OFFICER ED PITCHER 
vVITH RESPECT TO INAPPLICABLE CO-
:B~FFICIENTS OF FRICTION. 
POINT II (A). 
The court committed many errors in instructing the 
jury which prevented the defendant Irvine from having 
a fair and impartial trial. In Instruction No. 6 on ex-
pert witnesses the court by its instruction limited the 
qualification of expert witnesses to a doctor, engineer, 
appraiser or mechanic (italic ours). 
In Instruction No. 15 the court gave a general in-
struction on speed so that it applied to both drivers. 
Counsel for the parties in chambers had stipulated that 
th(~ 11<-'f endant Irvine was not guilty of driving at an ex-
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cess1ve speed and, therefore, withdrew that ground of 
negligence from the court. When the court submitted it 
to the jurors with respect to both drivers, it could hare 
no other tendency than to confuse them with respect to 
the defendant Irvine's conduct. This was prejudicial 
to the defendant Irvine. 
Instruction No. 20 provided that no person should 
turn a vehicle upon a public highway unless and until 
such movement could be made with reasonable safety. 
There is no evidence in this case that the defendant I nine 
after he entered the inside lane of traffic made any turn 
whatsoever from the lane in which he was traveling. It is 
also clear that he drove directly from a position at the 
stop sign over into the inside lane of traffic. This instruc-
tion, therefore, was inapplicable under the facts. Also the 
instruction, if it were applicable, should read in the last 
line thereof that the turn could be made with reasonable 
safety. 
Instruction 21 was also inapplicable because the 
right turn was made and completed some 180 feet prior 
to the point where the accident occurred. It was not the 
proximate cause of the accident. Inasmuch as the defend· 
ant Neil was far enough away that his vehicle was not a 
hazard to the defendant Irvine's vehicle when Irvine 
made his turn into the inside lane, the turn did not con· 
stitute negligence. If it be classified as negligence, then 
it certainly was not a proximate cause of the accident. 
In the case of Meahler v. Doyle, (1922) 271 Pa. 492, 
115 A. 797, it was held that although the act of the driyer 
28 
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of a motor truck in failing to keep to the right of the 
center of an intersection in making a left turn might 
under certain circumstances be negligence which would 
render the driver liable, this conduct did not render him 
liable for an injury to the rider of a bicycle who collided 
with the truck, where the act did not occur as a result of 
this act but happened after the truck had made the turn 
and had traveled on a curve for about 67 feet, all of the 
way in plain view of the rider of the bicycle, who had 
ample room to avoid the truck. The case of Nelson v. 
11folena, (Wash.) 334 P.2d 170, previously cited, is also 
authority for the fact that the right turn law instruction 
would not be applicable in this case. In the Nelson case 
the court held that where the impact occurred 60 to 100 
feet out of the intersection, the instruction on right-of-
way should not have been given. In our case with the 
impact occurring 180 feet approximately from where the 
defendant entered into the inside lane of traffic, the fail-
ure to make a right turn into the right-hand lane and 
then into the inside lane, if the law so requires, was no 
longer an important fact with respect to the accident that 
occurred. This instruction was certainly prejudicial to 
the defendant Irvine. 
In the case of McGregor v. Weinstein, et al., (Mont.) 
225 P. 615, a statute provided that a driver must keep to 
the right-hand curb while making his turn. The instruc-
tion in the case provided that the driver must keep close 
to the right-hand curb and failure to do so constitutes 
uegligence. The court held that the provisions of the 
statute are elastic and do not attempt to lay down definite 
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and rigid rules without reference to changing conditions 
in the street and highways, their freedom from othe; 
vehicles moving or stationary or fixed or permanent ob-
jects in the avenues of traffic or the position a person 
operating a vehicle shall occupy to be free of negligence. 
In Volume 2 of Blashfield Permanent Edition ~ 1084 it 
is stated: 
An ordinance requiring a vehicle to keep as close 
as possible to the right curb is not to be taken 
strictly, but is satisfied if the driver keeps as close 
to such curb as is reasonably possible. The some-
what similar requirement that the vehicle keep as 
close as practicable to the right-hand boundary 
of the highway is an elastic one which does not 
prescribe specific measurements or to lay down 
rigid rules as to the distance which the vehicle 
must keep from the curb. Instead it is a regula-
tion which looks to the circumstances of the case 
to give it color and meaning and convenience and 
the condition of the street including its relative 
freedom from all other vehicles or its more or 
less crowded condition must all be taken into con-
sideration in determining the position upon the 
street which the vehicle must occupy in order that 
the driver shall be free from negligence. 
In other words, it is not negligence for a driver to 
go into another lane of traffic other than the immediate 
right one if there is no traffic close enough to constitute a 
hazard to him if he does go into another lane. As stated 
in the cases and the articles all of these circumstances 
should be taken into consideration by the jury including 
the question of oncoming traffic. The court's instruc-
tions do not allow the driver such elasticity. 
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In both instructions Nos. 21 and 22 the court in-
' 
strudcd the jury that the defendant Irvine was under a 
duty not to change lanes until the driver had first ascer-
tained that such movement could be made with safety 
instead of using the term "with reasonable safety." In-
structions Nos. 20 and 22 were also duplicitous and un-
duly emphasized the duty, if any, on the part of Mr. 
Irvine with respect to turning from a lane of traffic or in 
making a turn. 
The court also committed error in giving Instruction 
No. 23 on sudden emergency. The instruction on sudden 
emergency is predicated upon the fact that the person 
1rho is confronted with peril must not have been negli-
gent himself in creating the peril. In Mr. Neil's case 
the peril or emergency, if any, was created by his own 
conduct which was very clear from the evidence. In 
tlie case of Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Ut. 465, 214 P. 
304, the accident occurred at nighttime when it was rain-
ing and the visibility was poor. The defendant did not 
see the plaintiff until he was within six feet of him, when 
he immediately applied his brakes, but was unable to stop 
before striking the plaintiff. The court stated that they 
were of the opinion as a matter of law under the facts 
disclosed by the record that at the time of the injury and 
immediately before defendant was not exercising rea-
sonable and ordinary care in the operation of his car and 
that if any emergency whatever existed, it was due en-
tirely to his ovm negligence and, therefore, he was not 
e11titled to an instruction on sudden emergency. 
31 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the case of Wright v. Sn.if fin, et al., (Cal. 1947), 
181 P. 2d 675 in an action against a motorist for death 
of a cyclist who attempted to pass the cyclist on the 
wrong side of the highway within 100 feet of an inter. 
section the court held that the motorist was not entitled 
to an instruction on sudden emergency even though the 
cyclist made a left turn in front of the motorist because 
the motorist was guilty of negligence as a matter of law 
in passing on the wrong side of the highway near the 
intersection. 
\Vhile the defendant Irvine was covering 180 feet, 
he was using up over five seconds of time. At the time 
he entered the lane, Mr. Neil was between 400 and 500 
feet away. All the distance he needed to slow to 35 miles 
per hour with a co-efficient of friction of .65 was 122 
feet or 1.7 seconds of time. All he had to do was slow 
down to 30 or 35 miles per hour, and there is no evidence 
to the contrary. 
The court erred, also, in failing to give defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 17 which stated that even 
though the defendant, Robert B. Irvine, may have been 
negligent in pulling out into the through highway from 
the stop sign, nevertheless, if the operator of the other 
vehicle actually sees or discovers the negligence in suf· 
ficient time to avoid the accident with opportunity so 
to do, then it is his duty to do so, and if he fails to act or 
avoid the accident with such opportunity, he is negligent. 
In this case Mr. Neil saw Mr. Irvine's vehicle at the 
stop sign, saw him pull into the intersection and watched 
him all the while, and yet apparently did nothing to try 
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to avoid the accident until he was almost at the point of 
impact. It was very clear that Mr.Neil had a clear chance 
to avoid the accident, but failed to do so and, therefore, 
this instruction should have been given. See Jones v. 
Kn1dsfn, 16 Ut. 2d 332, 400 P. 2d 562. 
While the court's error in giving some of the in-
structions complained about and excepted to by appel-
lant's counsel might be considered harmless, yet when 
considered over all there is so much error the trial was 
not a fair one as to the defendant Irvine and a new trial 
should be granted. 
POINT II(B) 
'rhe court committed error in allowing Captain 
Pitcher to testify over the objection of counsel during 
cross-examination by Mr. Hanson (R. 520-527) of the 
stopping distance of a vehicle on a highway having a 
co-efficient of friction of .45. The chart used by Officer 
Hayward was not in evidence (R. 140) and there was 
no testimony or evidence that the highway had a low 
c·o-efficient of friction such as .45. 
The court refused to allow Officer Hayward to tes-
tify as to the co-efficient of friction of the highway (R. 
243, 269). Captain Pitcher was required to testify as to 
the stopping distances on .45 even though there was no 
eYidence as to that co-efficient of friction and even though 
lie <lisagreed with any such co-efficient of friction for 
that highway (R. 526). The court refused to allow Of-
fi('rr Hayward to use the co-efficient of friction because 
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it would confuse the jury, but then improperly allowed 
J\Ir. Hanson, counsel for Neil, to question Pitcher about 
it even though it would confuse the jury. The court, in 
fact, stated as follows (R. 527, line 20): 
If Mr. Hanson wants to attempt to bewilder the 
jury with scientific terms, without an explanation 
of what drag-factor and what co-efficient of fric. 
tion means, it would seem to me you shouldn't ob. 
j ect to that. 
Later Captain Pitcher testified that he had super. 
vised tests made within a few hundred feet of the acci. 
dent sceue a few months after the accident and deter. 
mined an actual co-efficient of friction of .79 but the court 
refused to allow Pitcher to testify as to stopping or slrm. 
ing distances using the co-efficient of friction, except for 
the slowing distance from 60 miles per hour to 30 miles 
per hour of 114 feet (R. 572, 573). This was prejudicial 
to defendant Irvine in that both officers' testimony "itb 
respect to stopping distances was discredited. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court erred in failing to grant Irvine's re-
quest for a directed verdict and subsequently also com-
mitted error in failing to grant defendant Irvine's mo-
tion for a new trial. The appellant is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law in his favor. In the event the 
<'Ourt does not reverse the judgment, then appellant 
should be granted a new trial with appropriate direction 
to the trial judge with respect to instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. L. SUMMERHAYS of 
STRONG & HANNI 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
.Attorneys for Def enda!riit 
and .Appellant 
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